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Reassortment is an evolutionary mechanism by which influenza A viruses
(IAV) generate genetic novelty. Reassortment is an important driver of host
jumps and iswidespread according to retrospective surveillance studies. How-
ever, predicting the epidemiological risk of reassortant emergence in novel
hosts from surveillance data remains challenging. IAV strains persist and co-
occur in the environment, promoting co-infection during environmental trans-
mission. These conditions offer opportunity to understand reassortant
emergence in reservoir and spillover hosts. Specifically, environmental RNA
could provide rich information for understanding the evolutionary ecology
of segmented viruses, and transform our ability to quantify epidemiological
risk to spillover hosts. However, significant challenges with recovering and
interpreting genomic RNA from the environment have impeded progress
towards predicting reassortant emergence from environmental surveillance
data. We discuss how the fields of genomics, experimental ecology and epide-
miologicalmodelling arewell positioned to address these challenges. Coupling
quantitative disease models and natural transmission studies with new mol-
ecular technologies, such as deep-mutational scanning and single-virus
sequencing of environmental samples, should dramatically improve our
understanding of viral co-occurrence and reassortment. We define observable
risk metrics for emerging molecular technologies and propose a conceptual
research framework for improving accuracy and efficiency of risk prediction.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Dynamic and integrative
approaches to understanding pathogen spillover’.
1. Introduction
Reassortment is a prominent mechanism by which segmented viruses produce
genetic variation. Reassortment occurs when genetic segments from different
co-infecting virions within the same cell are packaged together, generating a
novel strain. Some of the most devastating outbreaks caused by influenza
A virus (IAV; a segmented RNA virus) are believed to have been driven by
reassortants [1,2], yet predicting reassortment remains elusive.
For avian IAVs, new reassortants can be generated in natural reservoir hosts
(wild water birds), where multiple strains of virus circulate naturally, or follow-
ing spillover from a reservoir host to an infected spillover host (e.g. poultry,
pigs or humans). Although reassortants with increased fitness may be
& 2019 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
produced less commonly than deleterious ones [3], reassor-
tants are observed frequently at the population scale among
natural virus isolates [4,5] suggesting that reassortment is
an important source of adaptation. Both co-infections
(a necessary precursor to reassortment) and reassortants are
often detected retrospectively during surveys of wild water-
fowl [6–11]. A comprehensive analysis of publicly available
genomic data from avian and mammalian host species
found that a substantial proportion of genomes (3%—646
total) were first time reports of novel reassortants [4]. Yet,
emergence of novel IAV reassortants remains unpredictable
and depends on host and virus populations [4]. One model
estimated a 3-year cycle of emergence and replacement of
avian IAV reassortants [9], but the highly pathogenic
goose/Guangdong/96 clade 2.3.4.4 H5 appears to be persist-
ing and contributing to the ongoing generation of novel
reassortants [12].
In wild birds, IAV transmission via the environment is a
major mechanism facilitating co-infection and host contact
with pathogens [13]. Environmental reservoirs, such as
ponds, can accumulate virus particles shed in faeces by
many individuals, increasing the co-occurrence and exposure
to different viral strains [13,14], and hence the likelihood of
co-infection. By extension, reassortment events that have
occurred in hosts using the same water body could be
revealed by sequencing individual whole viruses from the
environment over time and conducting genomic analyses,
thus increasing detection capabilities for the reassortant com-
binations present. Environmental reservoirs also increase
contact between species—i.e. species that may never contact
each other directly drink or feed from the same water
source. They additionally increase the infectious period
(time frame during which infectious particles can be trans-
mitted following infection) and expand the spatial
availability of viruses (locations where infectious particles
can be acquired), thus increasing the likelihood that novel
host species will make contact with a variety of different
viruses. Therefore, environmental transmission can overcome
barriers of spillover by increasing interspecies contact with
viable pathogens, and facilitating large jumps in viral diver-
sity and fitness by allowing co-infection and reassortment.
One of the most important public/livestock health chal-
lenges is to predict the emergence of novel strains from
surveillance systems. Predicting this epidemiological risk
for viruses that reassort frequently, such as IAV, requires an
understanding of the viral evolutionary ecology in reservoir
and spillover hosts and its significance in driving viral fitness
across scales [15]. Factors involved include predicting the rate
with which new reassortants are generated in cell tissues and
individual hosts (de novo reassortment), estimating the prob-
ability that a new reassortant will become predominant in
reservoir-host populations locally and regionally, and the
probability of spillover and transmission in spillover-host
populations (figure 1–1, 1-2).
We first review what is known from experimental studies
of within-host reassortment rates, environmental transmission
of IAV and assaying strain-specific fitness. We then outline
emerging technologies in environmental sampling, phenotyp-
ing, genomics and bioinformatics that could improve detection
and assessment of reassortants in environmental surveillance
samples. We describe how emerging technology could allow
efficient observation of reassortant dynamics in host popu-
lations, by incorporating environmental surveillance. Lastly,
we define risk metrics (e.g. figure 1-3) that can be measured
using these molecular technologies and describe conceptual
strategies for using those metrics to inform quantitative
frameworks designed for prediction of epidemiological risk
from environmental surveillance samples.
within and among cells
within an environmental
reservoir-host system
spillover and emergence in poultry
A B C D
de novo reassortmentrate: change in 
frequency of new reassortants between the
exposure dose and host-level samples
diversity dynamics: number, frequency
and relatedness of unique genotypes in the
dominant fraction in host-specific samples
and water samples over time
pathogen pressure: concentration (water
samples) or prevalence (host-specific
samples) of all viable viruses over time
dominant-strain phenotypes: an absolute
score for replication competence for each
dominant strain in the sample (within-host
fitness)
• A and B processes and…
• migration pathways, connectivity and
patch residence-time
• host density in space and time
• host species composition
• immunity profile/exposure history
• A, B and C processes and…
• poultry density in space and time
• contact with reservoir populations
• biosecurity
• spillover force of infection
• connectivity between operations
• susceptibility/adaptability to
reassortants
among water-host systems (along
flyways) 
1) scales of reassortment
2) processes
• multiplicity of infection
• timing that strains co-infect
• spatial structure of cells
• immune response
• viability and fitness of reassortants
• A processes and…
• environmental transmission
virion concentration (host density,
viral shedding, water body
characteristics)
viral persistence from abiotic factors
host susceptibility
viral uptake rate
3) risk metrics 
diversity dynamics, pathogen pressure and
dominant-strain phenotypes in sentinel
poultry at multiple sites over time along
flyways
diversity dynamics, pathogen pressure and
dominant-strain phenotypes in reservoir
hosts at multiple sites over time along
flyways
Figure 1. Scales at which reassortment occurs (1). In order to predict the emergence of reassortants in poultry (D), reassortment and transmission processes
(2) need to be understood at each scale. We propose risk metrics that can be measured at each scale (3) for development of predictive models of epidemiological
risk (figure 2).
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2. Knowledge from experimentation
Experiments have provided foundational knowledge on de
novo reassortment rates and combinatorial constraints
within hosts and cell tissues, yet predicting within-host
rates of reassortment from specific factors has just begun
[16,17]. Similarly, quantifying reassortment rates within an
environmental reservoir-host system (e.g. figure 1b) has
only rarely been addressed [11]. Below, we describe exper-
imental approaches that could be used to measure de
novo reassortment rates within hosts, and transmission of
reassortants in an environmental reservoir-host system,
allowing improved prediction of epidemiological risk from
surveillance data.
(a) Co-infection and reassortment processes
Significant progress has been made in understanding within-
host reassortment processes in spillover host models (i.e.
poultry and mammals) using experimental inoculation tech-
niques [16,17]. Rates of de novo reassortment within hosts
can be determined by co-infecting single hosts with known
parental genotypes and measuring the proportion of shed
virions that are reassortants. Such experiments have helped
to develop assays for studying reassortment rates within
hosts, and demonstrated substantial and highly variable
rates of reassortment within-host individuals ([18–22]; e.g.
8.7% of viruses recovered from ferrets co-infected with
human and avian strains were reassortants [18], to approxi-
mately 50% of viruses recovered from co-infections of
chickens with other chicken-derived subtypes [19], to 86%
in swine and guinea pigs co-infected with swine or human
strains [20,21]). The differences are thought to be owing to
functional incompatibilities between viral genome segments
or differing receptor binding specificities or other host restric-
tions, leading to low levels of co-infection in the same cells.
Within-host studies have determined that transmission
route, timing of exposures, dose, strains and strain compe-
tition all can influence co-infection and reassortment rates
[16,17,21]. Higher doses lead to higher rates of co-infected
cells [21]. When exposure with two different strains is offset
by a short period of time (12 h), co-infection and reassortment
rates are higher than when the host is exposed to the two
strains simultaneously [21]. Delayed introduction of the
second strain likely increases co-infection rates because it
allows the first strain time to infect many cells, thus maximiz-
ing co-infection potential by the second strain [21]. By
contrast, exposures with longer time lags can reduce co-infec-
tion because of super-infection exclusion mechanisms that
occur later post-infection (i.e. host innate immune function,
and viral processes such as receptor interference) [17] and
because death of infected cells occurs. As expected, effects
of co-infection time lags on reassortment rates can differ
depending on host-strain combinations and experimental
design [19]. Importantly, these advances in our understand-
ing of within-host reassortment provide a foundation for
predictive models to account for co-infection and reassort-
ment processes mechanistically in epidemiological models.
An important gap for experimentation is that little work
has focused on understanding reassortment in reservoir
hosts under natural transmission conditions (figure 1A);
how the lessons learned from animal models apply to wild
birds infected by environmental transmission remains
unknown.
(b) Environmental transmission
Models suggest that environmental reservoirs play an
important role in the ecology of IAVs because they allow infec-
tion between hosts that infrequently come into direct contact,
such as migratory wild waterfowl on breeding grounds
[13,14,23,24]. Experimental systems have shown the occurrence
of environmental transmission of IAVs among reservoir hosts
and from reservoir hosts to spillover hosts [25–28]. However,
the role of indirect transmission though the environment rela-
tive to other transmission mechanisms is not well understood
empirically, which is important for informing models aimed at
predicting epidemiological risk. One study identified a corre-
lation between host population density and environmental
levels of IAV [29]. Environmental transmission experiments
combined with molecular characterization and disease-
dynamic models would provide powerful tools for improving
our quantitative knowledge of environmental transmission,
co-infection and reassortment processes.
One key driver of environmental transmission is persist-
ence of viral viability after shedding into the environment.
There is substantial variation in environmental durability of
IAVs (between 1 and 600 days) depending on abiotic factors,
especially temperature, salinity, pH and mineral content of
the medium [30–35] and viral genotype [33,35], including
under natural conditions [36]. While some information is
available for water and bird faeces, studies with soil [37],
sediments [29,33,38] and plant material are few. Variation
in viral environmental persistence could be an important
component of fitness [39] and should be included in
models predicting the ecological and evolutionary dynamics
of IAVs. A final important knowledge gap is understanding
the relationship between environmental virus concentrations
and infectivity.
(c) Strain-specific fitness
Experimental studies are also helpful for evaluating pheno-
types (e.g. measures of within-host replication fitness) of
parental and reassortant viruses, a predictor of co-infection
and reassortment rates within hosts (figure 2a). Fitness of reas-
sortant strains is a crucial filter on emergence risk. Fitness
studies on human IAV strains provide some insights where
deleterious reassortment events were characterized by fewer
reassortant progeny and more limited replication efficiency in
spillover host cells [3,40]. Also poorly understood is the connec-
tion between within-host fitness and transmissibility (e.g. [41]).
Comparative genomics of IAV genomes from wild bird
and poultry samples identify putative genetic constellations
that can readily produce reassortants with high fitness in
reservoir and spillover host species (‘high risk’ markers).
These could be tested for potential fitness effects in vitro
with deep-mutational scanning approaches [42] to efficiently
phenotype a large number of strains for which the genotype
is known. Then putative ‘high risk’ markers can be identified
by statistically analysing the relationship between genotype
and phenotype. Using synthetically engineered or naturally
isolated genotypes in in vivo experimental infection and
transmission experiments could produce estimates of fitness
for particular genotypes or molecular markers in a given
host system (e.g. see techniques in [36]). At present, deep-
mutational scanning and in vivo techniques are too time-
intensive and costly to incorporate in large-scale surveillance
systems, but they are feasible for experimental settings and
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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thus hold promise for improving our understanding of viral
evolutionary dynamics and emergence.
3. Prospects from genomic technology
A fundamental hurdle with studying reassortment using gen-
etic data is knowing how different segments are distributed
among virions. In this section, we describe challenges at
each step, from acquiring genome sequences to detecting
reassortants in a collection of genomes. We further describe
cutting-edge advances that may make it possible to detect
and understand reassortment from an environmental reser-
voir-host system (figure 1B). In particular, the rapidly
growing field of environmental metagenomics provides a
framework for capturing IAV diversity from the environment
([43,44]; figure 1B). When applied in tandem with population
genomics analyses, environmental metagenomics could be a
useful tool for inferring reassortment events and for under-
standing the role of the environment in co-infection risk
and reassortant emergence (figure 1).
(a) Environmental sampling
A major challenge with environmental surveillance is captur-
ing the strain diversity of IAVs in the environment [38].
Questions include: do you sample water or soils or both?
How many samples per site? How deep do you sample?
How many technical replicates? A gold standard for capturing,
isolating and identifying true IAV diversity from the environ-
ment is still not established [45]. Similarly, the effects of
common environmental variables such as water turbidity,
rates of dispersion and diffusion and spatial heterogeneity
across water or other environments have not been examined,
although they affect environmental DNA capture from aquatic
organisms [46]. Because knowledge of how to sample the
environment for target RNA is still in its infancy, pilot studies
structured to optimize sampling protocols are critical (e.g. [47]).
Another major sampling challenge is RNA preservation
[48]. Filtration to capture virions/RNA requires hours at a
single site (e.g. 800 L) to achieve adequate probability of
virus detection [49]. Decontamination of pumping equipment
at each site is necessary, further increasing sampling time.
While these methods provide a useful means of collecting
environmental genetic sequences [46], methodological advance-
ments in RNA preservation/collection techniques are needed to
improve the efficiency of collecting high-quality RNA viromes
from environmental samples.
(b) Generating sequence data from environmental
samples
An initial field-based screen can rapidly prioritize localities
for further sampling efforts. Technological advances will
soon allow diagnostic PCR assays in the field, with results
within hours to minutes. Companies such as Biomeme
8, 9
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Figure 2. Approaches to predicting epidemiological risk in an environmental reservoir-host system. (a) Bottom-up approach. Develop a mechanistic disease trans-
mission model of the evolutionary and ecological processes (bolded numbers) involved in reassortment. Design controlled environmental transmission studies with
multiple strains and hosts. Then, iteratively fit and validate the mechanistic model and refine models and experiments based on learning. Top part of the plot shows
processes that need to be considered in the mechanistic model. Note that there are additional within-host processes (not shown here) such as super-infection
exclusion, within cell compartmentalization, spatial heterogeneity of target cells and others that can also affect the likelihood of reassortment. Numbers represent
the following processes: (1) some viruses degrade owing to environmental conditions, (2) selection for persistence, (3) viruses that persist can be transmitted,
(4) more than one virus strain can infect a single host either by co- or super-infection, (5) viral particles propagate within-hosts, as determined by the initial
dose and fitness of the inoculating strain(s), (6) co- or super-infection of individual cells and reassortment may occur as a function of multiplicity of infection
in target cells, (7) mutations with fitness effects occur during within-host replication, (8) selection for within-host replication influences the bottleneck size at
shedding into the environment (9). (b) Top-down approach. Develop a statistical model for predicting diversity-pressure-phenotypes. Collect surveillance data
from water, wild birds and sentinel chickens in multiple areas. Fit the model to the data to predict true reassortant diversity-pressure-phenotypes metrics. For
both bottom-up and top-down approaches, the first step is to develop predictive tools. Once the predictive tools are validated through research studies, they
can be applied to surveillance data (e.g. figure 1D ) to predict epidemiological risk in poultry.
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(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA) have developed field-
based nucleic acid extraction kits (M1 Sample Prep Kits)
and a hand held real-time PCR thermocycler that attaches
to a smart phone (two3TM Real-Time PCR Thermocycler).
Both of these have been deployed in the field to identify mos-
quito pools positive for RNA viruses in less than 2 h to target
samples for more thorough sequencing [50].
New sequencing platforms (e.g. MinION from Oxford
Nanopore Technologies) hold promise for field-based surveil-
lance of IAV owing to their rapid library prep and run times,
and elimination of PCR amplification. The MinION generates
long reads that allow sequencing of entire gene segments in a
single read, single-molecule sequencing and direct RNA
sequencing without conversion to cDNA and PCR amplifica-
tion [51,52]. For field-based pathogen surveillance, it is
possible to run a sequencer from a smartphone (e.g. Smid-
gION from Oxford Nanopore Technology). All of these
technologies currently lack high-throughput capacities, have
cost-prohibitive library prep, low sensitivity and high error
rates for application to broad-scale surveillance. Despite
these hurdles, there is a continual push to improve mobile
diagnostic capabilities [53,54], which will inevitably improve
efficiency, accuracy and precision of obtaining IAV genomic
data from environmental samples.
All contemporary sequencing platforms require a mini-
mum concentration of input nucleic acids, and water
samples tend to fall below this threshold, requiring enrich-
ment of target IAV RNA [55]. Centrifugation following
filtration has been effective at concentrating viral particles
[56]. The gold standard for IAV enrichment is virus culture
in either embryonated chicken eggs or Madin–Darby
canine kidney cells. These methods work well for clinical
samples, but there can be high costs and challenges with iso-
lating the virus from environmental samples [57–59].
Additionally, using virus isolates to study reassortment can
be counter-productive because of subtype and genomic
selection bias in media used to propagate isolates. PCR is
another method for enriching viral genomes, however, PCR
can preferentially amplify specific strains and introduce
nucleotide errors that can be difficult to distinguish from
true, low-frequency virus variants. The ideal approach is
direct sequencing of viral genomes without PCR (see below).
Another major challenge with viromic data from environ-
mental samples is delineation of individual genomes—i.e.
how do we distinguish potential reassortants from multiple
parental genotypes or viral mixtures? A common method is
to isolate individual genotypes using limiting dilution
plaque assays and subsequent whole-genome sequencing.
However, plaque assays can cause biased replication levels
between multiple strains because of tissue tropism [60],
in vitro strain mutation [61] and overlapping plaques [62],
all which can obscure the delineation of genotypes. Serial
dilution can reduce plaque overlap but is very time
consuming.
The advent of single-virus sequencing techniques [63,64],
similar to single-cell genome sequencing techniques of
eukaryotic and bacterial genomes [65], holds promise for cir-
cumventing several potential biases from viral isolation
techniques while providing sequence data from individual
virons. Using flow cytometry to isolate virions has improved
sequencing of single-virus genomes [63,66], but RNA input
requirements for library prep are still too high to allow the
sequencing of a single, non-enriched virus genome from
environmental samples. However, methods for conducting
single-virus RNA sequencing on a Nanopore or similar
single-molecule sequencing platform will undoubtedly be
realized in the near future, providing a valuable method
of delineating IAV genotypes that have not been subject to
selective media.
(c) Assembling genes and genomes for reassortment
analysis
The most widely used sequencing platforms generate short
reads, which makes genome assembly challenging because
there may not be enough overlap between reads to determine
alignments with high enough certainty. A common first step
is to remove non-target sequence reads. Environmental
samples include nucleic acids from non-target organisms,
for which sequenced genomes are not available. The effec-
tiveness of filtering is thus reduced, which increases
computing time for genome assembly. The two main
approaches for viral genome assembly are reference-based
mapping and de novo assembly. Mapping reads to a refer-
ence genome can simplify assembly, but reference genome
choice is not trivial and IAV genomic diversity in wild
birds is very high, which can bias results when trying to
recover viral population diversity [67]. De novo assembly of
segmented viral genomes is complicated because of incom-
plete and uneven coverage of different segments, which can
lead to skewed results or failed assemblies [68]. A useful
approach could be de novo assembly to build reference gen-
omes directly from the sample reads then map all the reads
back to this genome to recover the viral population diversity,
infer haplotypes and estimate their frequencies [67,69,70].
The ultimate goal is to accurately assemble all genome
variants in systems with high levels of diversity and deter-
mine dominant and low-frequency strains, which can
greatly influence epidemiologic outcomes.
(d) Detecting reassortants
Classically reassortants are identified by sequence alignment,
and if necessary by generating phylogenetic trees of each
gene segment to look for incongruent clades. An isolate can
be considered to be a reassortant if one or more gene seg-
ments have a significantly different position in a fully
resolved phylogenetic tree relative to other gene segments
[71]. However, in wild birds, IAV diversities are frequently
very high with multiple strains co-circulating, such that
both mixtures of parental sequences and reassortants may
be quite prevalent, resulting in phylogenetic trees that do
not differ significantly from trees generated at random [6].
To detect such reassortants, we must define a minimum
degree of difference in the topologies (e.g. [4]). The chosen
thresholds will impact inferred rates of reassortment in
surveillance samples.
Another challenge of detecting reassortants is that some
assumptions of phylogenetic methods are violated, as eco-
logical and evolutionary processes occur simultaneously in
viral populations. For example, phylogenetic trees assume
ancestral alleles are extinct, evolutionary patterns are bifur-
cating and no reticulation events have occurred [72]. Even
creative approaches to estimating the frequency of reassor-
tants in phylogenetic trees, such as discrete trait mapping
and Bayesian ancestral state reconstruction [73], do not
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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circumvent assumptions. Furthermore all eight gene
segments need to be analysed separately, which is computa-
tionally burdensome. To better detect viral reassortants, we
need to develop or apply approaches that align with viral
evolutionary processes rather than applying theories and
concepts developed for organisms with highly disparate
biology [74].
Population genetic approaches may be more appropriate
for identifying the frequency of reassortants in a set of gen-
omes. Phylogenetic networks are methods that account for
reticulate evolution and can identify reassortment events
[11,72,75,76]. There is promise in using coalescent theory
[77] and maximum-likelihood or Bayesian estimates of
migration [78]. An additional approach could be from popu-
lation genetic clustering algorithms (e.g. [79,80]), using
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes as
population delimiters and then using those as a framework
for estimating the replacement and ‘gene flow’ of the internal
segments. One final method could take advantage of recom-
bination metrics by using concatenated IAV gene segments
and treating the genomes as chromosomes. The exchange
of gene segments will thus lead to estimates of recombina-
tion rates that can serve as a proxy for reassortment
frequencies [76].
4. Approaches to predicting epidemiological risk:
the way forward
(a) Observing reassortment across scales
Within individual hosts (figure 1A), the important risk metric
is the de novo reassortment rate. Reassortment rates ideally
would be measured using the genomic diversity (number
of unique genotypes, frequency of each unique genotype,
and relatedness between genotypes) in samples from individ-
ual hosts over time during an infection, where the first time
point is the exposure dose of co-infecting viruses [22]. The fre-
quency of reassortants in each sample relative to parental
viruses at the first time point would give an empirical
index of the host-level rate of reassortment. From the
distribution of frequencies for all samples from an individual
host over time, one could calculate the mean and variation of
host-level reassortment rates. However, except in controlled
field experiments the genomic diversity of the exposure
dose will be unknown. As a proxy, genomic diversity of
samples from the environment could be used.
Extending these ideas, the next scale is reassortment in an
individual environmental reservoir-wild bird system
(figure 1B). We propose three complementary risk metrics
at this scale: the ‘diversity dynamics’ are captured by measur-
ing the genomic diversity in the water and faecal samples
from individual hosts over time; the ‘pathogen pressure’
[81] is the concentration of virions in water and their preva-
lence in the host population; and the ‘dominant-strain
phenotypes’ is a rapid assessment of replicative fitness for
strains that are most frequent in the surveillance samples.
We refer to these three important risk metrics together as
‘diversity-pressure-phenotyping’: data that can be observed
to understand and predict epidemiological risk. An impor-
tant condition is that these data are collected over time at
the same site (longitudinal sampling) in order to monitor
the process of reassortants being generated and selected
within hosts, and then shed and selected for persistence in
the environment (e.g. figure 2a). Linking the molecular mar-
kers that are identified in the ‘diversity’ data to phenotypes
will provide a mechanistic foundation for diversity dynamics.
At the next level ( figure 1C), diversity-pressure-
phenotyping in water and hosts could be measured across
space and time to surveil for reassortant emergence
along flyways. Lastly, concurrent surveillance of diversity-
pressure-phenotyping in sentinel poultry at sites where
water-host systems are being surveilled would provide an
ideal measure of predicted epidemiological risk for spillover
and emergence of reassortants in poultry (figure 1D).
(b) Bottom-up approaches: disease-dynamic modelling
Within-host viral dynamics of IAV have now been reasonably
well studied using experimental data [82,83], providing a
strong foundation for developing predictive models of reas-
sortment dynamics. Important factors determining within-
host viral kinetics for IAV include target-cell availability
[84], immune system factors [85], spatial distribution of
target cells [86] and initial dose [87]. While these viral kinetic
models have been developed using data from human infec-
tions [82,83], their insights and methods have begun to be
applied to avian hosts [88]. The most important factor for
reassortment is co-infection [16,17]. Thus, initial dose,
target-cell availability and the distribution of target cells
will play a primary role in predicting de novo reassortment
rates. Once reassortment has occurred within a host, selection
within the host and the size of the transmission bottleneck
will determine whether a reassortant is shed into the environ-
ment [16] (figure 2a). The recent advances in understanding
of intracellular and within-host processes that govern
reassortment [16,17] provide conceptual and quantitative
knowledge for models of within-host viral and reassortment
dynamics. In the larger context, the reassortment processes
and within-host viral dynamic models can be nested in
between-host models that account for selection, transmission
bottlenecks and environmental transmission processes (e.g.
[39]) to develop a predictive framework that can be validated
with experimental data (figure 2a).
Controlled experiments that allow transmission to occur
naturally coupled with data-driven modelling frameworks
(as above, figure 2a) together form a valuable stepping-
stone toward inferring epidemiological risk from genetic
samples. Controlled experiments are important for restricting
the range of potential genotypes and environmental factors
so that models can be designed to capture epidemiological
behaviour based on a limited and known set of factors. In
high-dimensional systems such as IAV, model-guided field-
work [89]—i.e. iterative model development, prediction and
experimentation (figure 2a)—can be applied for efficient
experimental design and knowledge building. By this
approach, models could be used to predict which processes
are the most important to assess. Then experiments would
test our knowledge of how ill-understood processes such as
environmental transmission contribute to the observed out-
come. For example, a poor-fitting model of diversity-
pressure-phenotyping would suggest that there are ill-
defined processes occurring in the system that are not well
captured or are absent in the model. Then the model and
experimental design could be adjusted to elucidate these ill-
understood mechanisms. This concept is not new [89] but it
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is surprisingly underused for designing empirical studies of
complex ecological and epidemiological systems with
ample process uncertainty. The iterative approach of hypoth-
esis generation!model building and prediction! data
collection!model evaluation aims to reduce process uncer-
tainty by targeted learning. Thus, it is a powerful approach
for identifying important gaps in our ability to predict reas-
sortment in environmental reservoir-host systems
(figure 1B), and to design effective experiments that will
best inform the identified gaps. Once this type of mechanistic
epidemiological model is developed and validated using
experimental data from controlled studies with natural trans-
mission, it could be used to predict epidemiological risk from
surveillance of diversity-pressure-phenotypes data in
environmental reservoir-host systems.
As an illustration of how these cross-scale processes could
be explored empirically, we describe a possible experimental
study to measure diversity-pressure-phenotypes and result-
ing infection risks in an environmental reservoir-host
system. A potential study would simulate a scenario where
multiple hosts infected with different virus strains would
be allowed to contaminate a quasi-natural environment.
Infected hosts would then be removed and susceptible
individuals would be exposed to the contaminated environ-
ment to allow for infection. Hosts and the environment
would be sampled longitudinally at regular intervals
throughout the experiment. All samples would be sequenced
to determine de novo reassortment rates and diversity-
pressure-phenotypes (figure 1; which measures the frequency
dynamics of particular genotypes and their associated pheno-
types, i.e. reassortant emergence). Testing both reservoir and
spillover host species (e.g. mallards and chickens) would
allow for determination of potential host differences in sus-
ceptibility and the impacts of diversity-pressure-phenotypes
on epidemiological dynamics. A similar design could be
applied to conditions that only allow direct contact between
hosts. Comparing results from both experiments would
help quantify transmission mechanisms and determine
which mechanisms lead to higher reassortment risk.
(c) Top-down approaches: statistical modelling of
sentinel surveillance (functional surveillance)
A second important approach to understanding and predict-
ing epidemiological risk is to apply statistical methods to
surveillance data from the environment and from reservoir
and sentinel hosts. While bottom-up approaches based on
experimental data have the power to improve inference
by reducing complexity, the inference is specific to the
conditions that are tested. For this reason, approaches
that measure diversity-pressure-phenotypes in natural popu-
lations are equally important. Phylogenetic or phylodynamic
methods have mostly been applied to estimate reassortment
occurrence, rather than to quantify its frequency or dynamics
(i.e. pattern-based surveillance as opposed to process-based,
which is ‘functional surveillance’). Additionally, because
these methods rely on historical genomic diversity for infer-
ence of current genomic diversity, they are retrospective not
predictive. We propose that longitudinal surveillance of
environmental reservoir-host systems, paired with systematic
deployment of sentinel host individuals (e.g. [11]), is an
important research direction that could improve the power
of top-down statistical tools for prediction of epidemiological
risk from environmental surveillance data.
Sentinel host sampling can allow for direct measurement
of spillover rates between reservoir and poultry host popu-
lations when surveillance occurs at the same locations over
time [90]. An example approach would include enclosures
of sentinel poultry adjacent to environmental reservoirs
used by waterfowl. This type of sentinel host design has
allowed for documentation of seasonal dynamics of spillover
[91] and evaluation of vaccination effectiveness [92]. The sen-
tinel host design would be coupled with frequent measures
of diversity-pressure-phenotypes in the environmental reser-
voir-host system, and in the sentinel hosts themselves, by
applying single-virus sequencing and phenotyping assays
to the samples (figure 2b). Analysis of genotype frequencies,
linked to measured phenotypes, could identify molecular
markers that are most likely to lead to outbreaks in poultry.
Another useful dimension within this design would be to
collect longitudinal data on the abiotic conditions of environ-
mental samples, densities of hosts and host-species
composition, concurrently with the longitudinal diversity-
pressure-phenotypes data. These data would be used as cov-
ariate data for predicting emergence risk in sentinel hosts
(figure 2b). Once validated with out-of-sample data from
multiple sites, this type of statistical framework could be
used to predict epidemiological risk in spillover hosts using
diversity-pressure-phenotypes and abiotic data collected
longitudinally from environmental reservoir-host systems.
Although these systems might not capture all of the real-life
complexity of contact structure between hosts, they would
include natural complexity from strain diversity and abiotic
factors, which is important for optimizing environmental sur-
veillance technologies and inference from environmentally
sampled data.
5. Conclusion
Understanding the emergence of novel reassortments across
ecological scales that include environmental transmission,
could transform risk assessment capabilities and add to cur-
rent approaches that use non-mechanistic or retrospective
genetic analyses. For example, shifting our focus from infer-
ring which strains have spilled over to predicting which
strains will successfully spill over from wild birds to poultry
in the near future. Advancements in molecular techniques
have brought the goal of predicting reassortment and spil-
lover risk of IAVs onto the near-term horizon. Coupling
risk-metric data, such as diversity-pressure-phenotyping,
with bottom-up and top-down quantitative models is poss-
ible and can yield frameworks for both understanding and
predicting reassortant emergence.
Although it is still not possible to collect diversity-
pressure-phenotyping data routinely as part of large-scale
surveillance systems, technological refinements that dramati-
cally improve efficiency can occur rapidly. Once more
efficient molecular technologies are available, scaling up
their application to surveillance programmes will require a
strong research foundation that has addressed fundamental
gaps in the evolutionary ecology of IAVs; a knowledge base
that is inextricably linked to the natural life cycle and com-
plexity of this host–pathogen system. Thus, addressing the
basic science knowledge gaps with current technology, as
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we have outlined, is an important stepping-stone towards
developing more accurate and efficient risk assessment and
surveillance programmes. However, even at a fine scale, the
research approaches we outlined will require substantial
investment because they require wide-ranging interdisciplin-
ary collaboration and specialized facilities (i.e. animal
pathobiology, cutting-edge sequencing technology, bioinfor-
matic resources and skills, and expertise in mathematical
and statistical modelling). Collaborations of this breadth are
expensive but are feasible. The potential payoffs from
improvements to risk assessment and outbreak prevention
through evidence-based biosecurity could greatly outweigh
the costs in the long term.
The improved surveillance system we envision can be
characterized as ‘functional surveillance’: collecting and inte-
grating appropriate surveillance data into analytical
frameworks that describe emergence processes (as opposed
to patterns). Functional surveillance would complement
current approaches of using pattern-based surveillance
by improving our understanding of emergence processes
(e.g. [93]). The mechanistic underpinnings of functional
surveillance will allow for better prediction as conditions
change, a current weakness of retrospective risk assessments.
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